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Abstract 
We examine whether family doctor firms in England respond to local competition by increasing 
their quality. We measure quality in terms of clinical performance and patient-reported 
satisfaction to capture its multi-dimensional nature. We use a panel covering 8 years for over 
8000 English general practices. We measure competition as the number of rival doctors within 
a small distance and control for a large number of potential confounders. We find that increases 
in local competition are associated with increases in patient satisfaction and to a lesser extent 
in clinical quality. However, the magnitude of the effect is small. 
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1 ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Quality competition is pervasive and important. Quality is a key component of service products 
such as, transport, telecoms, banking, education and healthcare. Competition on quality is a 
central component of industrial organisation (product differentiation, bundling, price 
discrimination). But the relationship between quality and competition is hard to study 
empirically. Quality is multi-dimensional and often difficult to measure, product prices and 
quality are typically set together, and market structure and quality are jointly determined. 
Empirical studies on quality competition are relatively scarce.1 
 
One area where an understanding of the empirical relationship between quality and market 
structure is central is healthcare. Healthcare accounts for over 10 percent of the economy of 
most developed countries. The quality of care can have large, and long-lasting, effects on the 
health of the consumer. Injecting greater competition into heavily regulated healthcare markets 
is a popular reform model in many jurisdictions (Gaynor et al. 2016; Glied and Altman, 2017; 
OECD, 2012; Siciliani et al., 2017). But this takes place against the backdrop of a long-term 
trend of provider consolidation in healthcare markets (Gaynor and Town, 2012; Fulton 2017). 
Understanding the relationship between quality and market structure in healthcare is therefore 
important.  
 
Theoretically, the relationship between competition and quality is ambiguous (Gaynor and 
Town, 2012), even in markets where price is regulated (Brekke et al., 2011; 2014) Empirically, 
the bulk of the literature on the relationship between competition and quality in the hospital 
sector points towards a positive relationship where price is regulated (Gaynor and Town, 
2012).2  In this paper we examine the relationship between quality of care and market structure 
in local physician markets.  This has been much less researched and the empirical evidence is 
scarce (Gaynor and Town, 2012). Yet, as in the hospital sector, physician markets are becoming 
more concentrated and much of this is below the radar of regulatory authorities (Capps et al., 
2017). If effort is to be spent promoting competition there is a need to know whether this will 
increase quality.  
                                               
1
 Examples include the media (Berry and Waldfogel, 2001; Fan, 2016), airlines (Mazzeo, 2003), supermarkets 
(Matsa, 2010). 
2
 For recent evidence from the UK see Cooper et al. (2011), Gaynor et al. (2013), and Bloom et al. (2015). Moscelli 
et al. (2018) find more mixed results. 
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We study family physician firms (known as general practices) in the English National Health 
Service (NHS). General practices provide primary care (healthcare outside the hospital or 
nursing home setting) and act as gatekeepers to almost all other services provided by the NHS. 
They are small businesses, typically owned and run by a partnership of 4-5 general practitioners 
(GPs) who employ nursing and other staff.  Almost all practices operate in a single small local 
market.  In common with most European countries, care is free at point of use. Payments to 
practices are determined nationally and the institutional set-up gives practices an incentive to 
compete for patients. Patients can only register with one practice and around 75% of practice 
revenue comes from the number of patients registered with the practice.  As patients face zero 
prices, any positive effect from competition has to come from changes in quality.  Figure 1 
shows the market structure for England (as measured by the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of concentration of practice registrations) across the small areas from which GP practices 
draw their potential patients.  The figure shows considerable variation in market concentration.  
Some markets are unconcentrated, others are highly concentrated. Markets in urban areas are, 
as expected, much less concentrated than those in rural areas but even within urban and rural 
areas there is considerable variation.  In this setting, patient choice of practice has been shown 
to be responsive to quality (Santos et al., 2017). Thus, the pre-requisites for competition 
between providers to improve quality exists: the question is whether it does.  
 
To answer this, we study the universe of all GP practices (over 8000) in England between 2005 
and 2012.3  We use six practice-specific measures of quality, some relating to the quality of 
medical care as judged by national clinical standards and others relating to patient reported 
satisfaction with their chosen practice. Our empirical strategy is to exploit changes in market 
structure at the local level, specifically within-practice changes in the number of GPs in other 
local rival practices. While this design controls for fixed unobservables at the GP and local area 
level, it is possible that GPs sort into areas in which there are easier to treat patients or respond 
to increased competition by selecting easier-to-treat patients for whom it is easier to achieve 
quality indicators.  Moreover, areas where population density increases are likely to experience 
an increase in the number of GPs. Practices in such areas will find it easier to produce higher 
quality if the increase in density is driven by the entry of more mobile populations who tend to 
                                               
3
 All our data are for UK financial years which run from 1 April to 31 March. 
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be healthier (Hayes et al., 2017).  Such practice level patient changes will lead to overestimates 
of the effect of competition.  To avoid this, we control for a large set of time-varying measures 
of the health and socio-economic status (SES) of the population of the local area from which 
the practice may draw its population and for population density. This design allows us to 
address the potential endogeneity which would arise if areas with better amenities attract more 
doctors or healthier patients for whom it is easier to achieve higher clinical quality. In 
robustness tests we consider alternative measures of competition facing general practices, 
allow for changes in the composition of GPs in the practice and its rivals to isolate the effect 
of increased effort from changes in GP composition, and also exploit a policy change that 
increased supply of GPs in some areas but not in others.  
 
Our results show that an increase in the number of GPs in rival practices is associated with 
increases in both clinical quality and, especially, patient satisfaction. None of our results 
suggest that greater competition reduces quality. However, in common with results from 
studies of pay for performance and other policies aimed at improving the quality of care 
provided by family doctors (Scott et al., 2011), the magnitude of the effect of a change in 
competition is not large. 
 
Our findings contribute to the literature on quality competition in physician markets and to the 
debate about whether policies to strengthen competition in these markets should be pursued. 
In the European setting where there is no price competition amongst providers (providing the 
ideal setting for examining pure quality competition), there are few studies of the physician 
market and quality.  In the main this literature lacks the exogenous variation needed for causal 
inference, uses a limited number of outcomes measures, some of which have an ambiguous 
relation to quality, or analyses small area, rather than firm (physician practice) variation.  
Schaumans (2015) and Pike (2010) exploit only cross±sectional variation. The former 
examines the effect of competition in the Belgian family doctor market on pharmaceutical 
prescriptions. Prescriptions have no direct effect on practice revenue or cost but may make the 
patient feel that the doctor is taking their health concerns seriously. The unit of analysis in 
Schaumans (2015) is the small area and she finds little effect. Pike (2010) undertakes analysis 
at the physician practice level and, as in our study, uses a distance based measure of competition 
and examines a subset of the quality measures we examine here. He finds that practices with 
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more nearby practices have higher quality. However, as the data is cross-sectional in both these 
studies, the associations may reflect factors other than spatial competition between doctors. 
 
Brekke et al. (2017) have rich data at the individual physician level and exploit the fact that 
Norwegian doctors practice in two different settings: their own offices where they see their 
own patients, and local emergency clinics ZKHUHWKH\VHHWKHLURZQDQGRWKHU*3V¶SDWLHQWV. 
They argue that this means that GPs face greater competitive pressure when they practice in 
their own offices and thus will be more responsive in this setting. They examine one outcome: 
the dispensation of µsick notes¶ (documents which allow individuals to take time off work with 
no financial penalty). The setting provides a robust design which allows controls for physician 
effects, patient effects and physician-patient pair effects. But the outcome variable is not a 
measure of clinical quality but of responsiveness to patients and may have ambiguous welfare 
implications if physicians over-prescribe notes to attract patients. More problematic is that the 
definition of competition: what they examine is not spatial competition but physician behaviour 
under different contracting arrangements.   
 
The closest research to our paper is Dietrichson et al. (2016). This exploits a reform in Swedish 
primary care which led to greater entry of providers in municipalities where there was lower 
availability of providers pre-reform. The authors study both clinical and patient satisfaction 
measures of quality at the municipality level.  They find small improvements in subjective 
overall quality measures, but no change in avoidable hospitalisations or patient satisfaction 
with access to primary care. However, although their policy experiment provides a nice 
context, their unit of analysis is not the firm (the practice) but the municipality.  This means 
that they cannot rule out the possibility that average municipal quality was affected by other 
municipality level factors, such as an overall increase in the physician-patient ratio, rather than 
increases in competition facing individual providers.  
 
Research on market structure in physician markets where price and quality are set 
simultaneously is mainly from the USA and is also limited compared to studies of hospital 
markets. The research primarily focuses on the impact on prices rather than quality (Baker et 
al., 2014; Sun and Baker, 2015). It also has to address the fact that prices are increasingly set 
by complex bargaining between insurers and hospital (see, for example, Clemens and Gottlieb, 
2017). The European setting, in which prices are set nationally and patients are generally fully 
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insured, provides a cleaner setting for an examination of the relationship between quality and 
market concentration in small localised physician markets. It is also particularly relevant to 
discussions about increasing the role for regulated prices as a way of promoting quality 
competition in the US healthcare market (Glied and Altman, 2017). 
 
The next section provides a brief account of the institutional framework for English general 
practices and of policies potentially affecting the amount of effective competition that practices 
face.  Section 3 sets out the estimation methods and strategies for identifying the effect of 
competition.  Section 4 describes the data.  Results are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2 ,QVWLWXWLRQDOEDFNJURXQG 
 
The English NHS provides health care which is tax-financed and free at point of use.4  NHS 
primary care is provided by family doctors (GPs) organised into small groups, known as 
general practices. All individuals resident in England are entitled to register with a general 
practice, and have incentives to do so as practices both provide primary care and act as the 
gatekeeper for elective (non-emergency) hospital care.   
 
In our study period (2005 to 2012) there are over 8000 general practices in England with an 
average of just over 4 (4.2) GPs and 6,600 patients (HSCIC, 2015).5  Most are located at a 
single site though around 15% have more than one.  Almost all are owned by partnerships of 
their GPs. Larger groups and chains have been absent until recently and are still rare. The NHS 
contracts with the practice rather than the individual GPs.  Practices are paid by a mix of lump-
sum payments, capitation, quality incentive payments, and items of service payments.  Around 
75% of practice revenue varies with the number of patients registered with the practice. 6  
Practices are reimbursed for the costs of their premises and information technology but fund 
                                               
4
 A small charge is made for dispensed medicines, but because of exemptions on grounds of age or low income, 
this is only applied to around 10% of prescriptions.  
5
 Under 10% of GPs are single-handed (i.e. practices with only one GP). GPs do not work across practices.  
6
 Over 50% is from capitation payments determined by a national formula which takes account of the demographic 
mix of practice patients and local morbidity measures. Quality incentives from the national Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) (Roland, 2004) generate a further 15% of practice revenue and for a given quality level QOF 
revenue increases with the number of patients.  Practice payments for providing specific services including 
vaccinating and screening target proportions of the relevant practice population also increase with the total number 
of patients registered with the practice.   
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all other expenses, such as hiring nurses and clerical staff, from their revenue.  A very rough 
estimate, under the assumption that average revenue and cost per patient are constant, is that 
an additional patient registered with the practice produces revenue of £135, expenses of £80, 
and net income of £55 per practice partner.7  Thus practices have an incentive to attract patients. 
 
The operation of practices is overseen by area-based NHS administrative bodies known, during 
the period of our study, as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). PCTs contained on average 350,000 
patients and 55 practices.  Practices are required to accept all patients who live within their 
agreed catchment area set by agreement with their PCT unless they notify the PCT that they 
are full and temporarily not accepting patients for between 3 and 12 months.  Around 2% of 
practices have such closed lists at any one time.8,9  However, while some practices may be 
temporarily closed, this does not mean there is no choice for patients.  On average patients in 
small homogenous geographical areas that contain on average 1500 people are registered with 
13 different practices.10  This means practices potentially face a high degree of competition for 
patients. On average practices have 25 rival GPs located in practices within 2km (more details 
in Section 4 below).  
 
Government policy over a relatively long period has been to increase competition between 
practices. The national body which regulated the location of general practices was abolished in 
2002 and replaced by a tendering process, run by the local administrative bodies responsible 
for over-seeing health care delivery, and intended to make it easier for new practices to be 
established.  Restrictions on the type of organisation which could provide general practice 
services were also eased in 2004, so that general practices can be run by other NHS institutions 
                                               
7
 In 2009/10 there were 26,420 GP contractors (i.e. joint owners rather than salaried employees) in England with 
average gross income £287,100l, expenses of £168,700 and net income of £109,400.  There were 2066 registered 
patients per GP contractor. See: GP Earnings and Expenses 2009/10, http://www.hscic.gov.uk/pubs/gpearnex0910 
(last accessed 10 March 2015);   General and Personal Medical Services, England 2001-2011, 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB05214 (last accessed 10 March 2015). 
8
 House of Commons, Hansard Written Answers for 28 Apr 2008. 
9
 Practices with closed lists are not eligible for certain types of payments for providing additional services. 
Consequently sRPHSUDFWLFHVGHVLJQDWHWKHPVHOYHVDVµRSHQEXWIXOO¶.  Estimates suggest that in 2007 up to 10% 
RISUDFWLFHVZHUHµRSHQEXWIXOO¶DWDQ\WLPH1DWLRQDO$XGLt Office, 2008) but, since the designation is unofficial 
and has no legal force, its extent and effect on patients signing up to the practice are unclear. GPs can deregister 
patients if there is a fundamental breakdown in the doctor-patient relationship.  It has been estimated that each 
year 0.1% of patients are deregistered (Munro et al, 2002).  If a patient cannot find a practice prepared to accept 
them, they can ask their PCT to find them a practice, and PCTs can assign patients to practices. Around 0.5% of 
patients are assigned to practices (Audit Commission, 2004).    
10
 The area is the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA), discussed in more detail in Section 4 below. 
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such as hospitals, and by private companies, as well as traditional partnerships of GPs.  
Practices cannot advertise for patients but, in a drive to increase choice by patients in all areas 
of English healthcare, the national government established the NHS Choices website in 2007. 
The website contains information on the characteristics of general practices, including the 
specialist clinics they offer and results from patient satisfaction surveys. These data are 
published with the express aim of increasing choice and, through this, improving quality.11 
 
During our sample period there was a major national policy initiative to increase the supply of 
family doctor care.  Known as the Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care (EAPMC) policy, 
the aim was to increase supply in the 38 PCTs (out of a total of 151 PCTs) in which there was 
evidence of a shortage of GPs relative to patient need (Asaria et al, 2015; Department of Health, 
2007).  The policy, funded with £250 million from central government, operated from financial 
year 2008 to 2011 and increased the supply of GPs in the 38 EAPMC PCTs relative to other 
PCTs (Asaria et al., 2015).  We make use of the policy in one of our battery of robustness tests. 
 
3 (PSLULFDOVWUDWHJ\ 
Our empirical approach is to examine the quality change in a practice following a change in 
competition from rival GP practices, exploiting the fact that we observe the universe of GP 
practices over an eight year period. Our basic model is  
        (1) 
where yjt is the quality of practice j in year t, Et is a year effect common to all practices, mjt is 
the measure of competition facing practice j in year t, xjt is a vector of case-mix controls 
measured either for the practice list population or for the local population, and Įj is a time 
invariant practice fixed effect.  The data period is eight financial years 2005-2012. We estimate 
this model for all practices in England and also for practices located in homogeneous areas. 
The coefficient of interest is G Details of how we measure quality, competition, the set of rival 
practices and the covariates are presented in section 4.  
 
                                               
11
 The NHS Choices website states³The idea is to provide you with greater choice and to improve the quality of 
GP services over time, as GPs providing a good service are naturally more 
SRSXODU´$ERXW1+6VHUYLFHVGRFWRUV3DJHVSDWLHQW-choice-GP-practices.aspx http://www.nhs.uk/ NHSEngland. 
http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Yourchoices/GPchoice/Pages/ChoosingaGP.aspx. Detailed information on 
performance of practices in an area under the national pay for performance scheme is also available via 
http://www.qof.ic.nhs.uk/search/ and information from surveys of patient satisfaction is available at 
http://www.gp-patient.co.uk/info/.  
jt t jt jt x j jty mE G D Hc    x ȕ
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In estimating this model we need to deal with a number of issues that threaten identification of 
the competition effect.  First, common to estimation of the impact of market structure on quality 
in all health care markets, including primary care, is that any measure of outcome needs to be 
adjusted for patient case-mix. Second, practice location is not exogenous to the patient or the 
GP.  If easier-to-treat patients sort to practices that are of higher quality, the effect of 
competition will be over-estimated. Alternatively, if an increase in quality attracts the harder-
to-treat patients, the effort effect of competition will be underestimated. Relatedly, where to 
locate is also chosen by GPs and practices. As practices are not allowed to refuse patients from 
within their agreed catchment areas and practices are rewarded on the basis of performance as 
well as number of patients, it is possible that practices choose to locate in areas in which 
patients are easier to treat (typically those areas in which patients are healthier and more 
affluent). If so this will upwardly bias estimates of the impact of competition.  Alternatively, if 
practices are less likely to enter near a practice which provides high quality, this will 
downwardly bias the estimated effect of competition on quality.12  
 
The third issue is the choice of the measure of competition. We have to define the market in 
which practices operate and what is a measure of a change of competition. We define a market 
as a fixed radius around a practice and a change in competition as a change in the number of 
rival GPs in this market. (We discuss the rationale for these two choices in section 4 below and 
subject both to a number of robustness checks.)  Given this choice, an increase in our 
competition measure may be due to an increase in population density if this leads to the entry 
of more practices or to existing practices taking on more GPs. If this is the case, an increasing 
number of rival physicians may not imply greater competition for patients since the number of 
patients in the area will also have increased.  Moreover, an increase in population density may 
also lead to a local population which is healthier if there is a healthy migrant effect. It is also 
possible that an increase in population in an area leads existing practices to take on additional 
GPs who are more motivated than the existing stock and so produce higher quality. In this case, 
the increase in quality would be wrongly attributed to effort rather than a change in the 
composition of the GPs in the practice. 
 
                                               
12
 This is similar to the problems encountered in estimating the effects of hospital competition (see, for example, 
Kessler and McLellan (2000) for the USA and Gaynor et al. (2016) for the UK). 
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We address these concerns in the following way. Our fixed effects specification controls for 
unobserved time invariant patient characteristics and time invariant characteristics of GPs in 
the practice and its rivals and the area the practice is located in.  We have a rich set of time 
time-varying casemix controls that we can also include in our models. At the practice level we 
have a large number of measures of the health of the practice population. At area level we have 
controls for population density, demography, morbidity, SES, and the attractiveness of the area 
to GPs.  
 
We begin by comparing models with and without casemix and other controls. If the results are 
robust to exclusion of these measures, it suggests that selection on observables is not a problem 
and hence possibly there may be little bias from selection on unobservables.  Second, we 
replace the case-mix controls based on the characteristics of the actual practice patients with 
measures of the same characteristics for the local population from which the practice could 
potentially draw its patients. This allows us to address confounding associated with changes in 
the practice population in response to quality change. Third, we undertake an analysis using 
only those practices located in areas with homogeneous socio-economic characteristics. We 
argue that practice location and patient selection of practices in these homogenous areas is 
exogenous to amenities and unobserved population type, because amenities and population 
type do not vary within these areas. Hence in such areas we can identify the effect of market 
structure by its within area variation (as in Gravelle et al, 2016). We therefore carry out a sub-
set of analyses only for practices in small geographical areas characterised by low variance in 
their population type as measured by small area social and economic deprivation of the 
population (more details are provided in Section 4). 
Fourth, we undertake robustness checks of the definition of the market. Fifth, to address 
concerns that increases in demand lead to changes in the composition of the GPs in the local 
market, we estimate models controlling for the composition of GPs in the practice and that of 
their rivals. Finally, to address potential endogeneity of change in the number of GPs as a 
function of quality (practices may not choose to expand when located near a high quality 
practice) we exploit the EAPMC policy. This policy exogenously increased the number of GPs 
in EAPMC PCTs relative to non-EAPMC PCTs (Asaria et al., 2015). While the details of this 
policy are not well articulated in policy documents ± for example, the exact algorithm for 
choice of treated PCTs is not made public and when exactly post-2009 PCTs spent more on 
GPs is not clear  it did increase our measure of competition. Post-policy, practices located in 
10 
 
EAPMC PCTs faced a larger increase in the number of GPs in nearby rival practices than 
practices located outside EAPMC PCTs.13  We therefore use this policy to test for the effect of 
an increase in the number of rivals which is not confounded by practice choice of location. To 
overcome the problem of specifying the exact date at which the policy was implemented in 
each treated PCT, we estimate long difference models in which we compare the changes in 
quality in practices before and after the introduction of the EAPMC in the 38 EAPMC PCTs 
with the changes in quality in practices in 113 non-EAPMC PCTs.  To allow for the fact that 
treated PCTs are not random (by definition they are those where there was considered to be a 
shortage of family doctor care relative to need), we also estimate the same model using only 
those practices located within 2km of the border of an EAPMC PCT.   
 
In a selection-on-observables design, it is not possible to control for all potential confounders. 
For example, there may be remaining changes in practice populations that we do not observe 
that may bias our estimated effect of competition on quality. However, as discussed above, it 
is not clear a priori which way these unobservables would affect the estimated effect.  We 
consider that the large set of observable controls that we use in our design (discussed in Section 
4), and the different estimation strategies we adopt (outlined here), should mitigate concerns 
that the effects we find are driven by unobserved changes in patient type or area changes that 
might be linked to the production of quality and to our spatial measures of competition. 
 
4 'DWD 
 
4.1 Quality 
To capture the multi-dimensional nature of health care quality we use three measures of clinical 
quality and three of patient reported experience. 
 
Clinical quality. We measure the clinical quality of care in the practice with data from the 
national Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).  Almost all practices take part in the QOF, 
which rewards practices for achievement on a large number of quality indicators.  Some 
indicators are linked to record keeping  for example, the percentage of patients with 
                                               
13
 Post-policy, practices in EAPMC PCTs had an average increase of one more rival GP (within 2km) than 
practices located outside EAPMC (Appendix Table A5. The within practice variance in the number of rivals 
within 2km for the whole sample is 6.8, so an increase of one rival GP is a relatively large within-practice change.  
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hypertension whose notes have a record of blood pressure in the previous 9 months. Some are 
for treatment  for example, the percentage of patients with coronary heart disease currently 
treated with a beta blocker.  And some are for intermediate health outcomes  for example, the 
percentage of patients with diabetes whose last HbA1C reading is 7.4 or less.  Better 
achievement increases the number of QOF points (up to a maximum of 1000) and practices are 
paid an average of £125 per point.  We use the percentage of total available points which the 
practice achieved as a measure of quality (QOF points). It has the merit of being simple and 
readily observable by patients and physicians.  
 
Total QOF points has some drawbacks as a measure of clinical quality. First, only around two 
thirds of the points are for indicators of clinical quality for specific conditions.  The others are 
related to more general aspects of practice management, for example record keeping or 
providing information to patients.  Second, for most condition specific clinical indicators, 
increased achievement on the indicator does not affect the number of points awarded if the 
percentage of relevant patients for whom the indicator is achieved is less than a lower threshold 
(usually 40%) or above an upper threshold (which ranged from 60% to 90%).14   Third, the 
number of points earned on these indicators is based on reported achievement measured as 
100*N/(PE), where N is the number of patients for whom the indicator is achieved, and P is 
number of patients with the relevant condition.  E is the number of patients with the condition 
who are exception reported for the indicator by the practice, for example because the patient 
refused to attend or there were contra-indications for treatment.   
 
To deal with potential gaming of exception reporting patients as ineligible for an indicator 
(Gravelle et al., 2010), we measure performance on a given indicator as population 
achievement 100*N/P. This is the percentage of patients with the relevant condition for whom 
the indicator has been achieved and is not affected by exception reporting (Doran et al., 2006).15  
                                               
14
 Very few practices fail to achieve the lower threshold.  Many practices exceed the upper threshold for an 
indicator and so would earn no additional financial reward by achieving the indicator for more patients.  This may 
occur because (a) some indicators apply to small numbers of patients: a practice with 5 patients with the relevant 
condition for an indicator with an upper threshold of 65% would have to achieve the indicator for at least 4 (a 
population achievement rate of 80%) to earn the maximum points; (b) practices may be risk averse and over 
achieve to guard against treated patients leaving the practice before the financial year end when achievement is 
calculated; (c) GPs have intrinsic motivation and care directly about patient outcomes. 
15
 We also estimated models for reported achievement and the results were very similar to those for population 
achievement, suggesting that any reporting of patients as ineligible does not affect our results.  The correlation of 
reported and population achievement was 0.83 in our data. 
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As our second measure of clinical quality we use PA clinical: the weighted average of the 
percentage of patients with the relevant condition for whom the indicator is achieved, taken 
over the 42 clinical indicators which were consistently defined between 2005 and 2012.  The 
weights are the maximum points available for the indicators.   
 
As a third measure of clinical care quality we use the number of emergency hospital admissions 
of practice patients for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs). These are conditions 
for which emergency admissions could be reduced by good quality primary care. We use the 
definition provided by Harrison et al. (2014) to count the number of emergency admissions for 
ACSCs per 1000 patients (ACSC rate) for each practice in each year from 2005 to 2012.16 
 
Patient reported quality. We construct patient reported measures of quality using responses to 
three questions in the national General Practice Patient Survey (GPPS) administered to a 
random 5% sample of patients in each practice in each year from 2006 onwards. Open hrs sat 
is the percentage of respondents satisfied with their GP surgery opening hours (available for 
2006-2012); Care sat is the proportion of patients satisfied with overall care in their practice 
(available for 2008-2012); Recommend is the proportion of patients who would or might 
recommend their practice (available for 2009-2012).17 
 
The within-practice (demeaned) correlation coefficients of these measures are reported in 
Appendix Table A2 for the years 2009-12 (the period for which all variables are available).  
The correlation between the clinical quality and the satisfaction measures is low, indicating 
that they measure different aspects of quality. The correlations within the clinical and 
satisfaction measures are higher, but not so high that the measures of quality are simply 
duplicates of each other.  
 
                                               
16
 Some ACSCs are incentivised by the QOF (e.g. diabetes, asthma) whereas others are not (e.g. anaemia, cellulitis 
and perforated ulcer). We count both incentivised and non-incentivised ASCS emergency admissions  using the 
admission method and diagnostic fields in the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) dataset. 
17
 The wording of the questions changed somewhat over the sample period but we assume that including year 
dummies in the regression models will allow for this.  In other work on the determinants of ACSC admission rates 
using these variables, we also interacted them with year dummies and found that the interactions were small and 
rarely significant (available from the authors on request). 
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4.2 Competition 
Competition in general practice care takes place in a local market since patients seek care by 
going to their practice in person (or, more rarely, a practice GP coming to their home).  As a 
result, the probability that a patient is registered with a practice declines rapidly with the 
distance of the practice from their home.  Around 40% of patients register with the nearest 
practice. A study of a large English region found that the median distance to the nearest practice 
was 0.84km (mean = 1.2km) and the median distance to the chosen practice was 1.48km (mean 
=1.88km). The same study also found that the cross-practice elasticity of demand with respect 
to quality declined rapidly with distance (Santos et al, 2017).    
 
The smaller the radius used to define the market area for a practice, the greater the proportion 
of practices with no measured competition, and the smaller the proportion of patients who 
choose a practice within this distance. Appendix Table A3 shows these statistics for radii 
ranging from 0.5 to 5km.  On the basis of these distributions, we use a 2km radius to measure 
the market area for a practice.  Only one tenth of practices have no rivals within 2km and over 
two thirds of patients choose a practice within this distance.   
 
In defining the number of rivals within this market, we had two choices.  The first was the 
number of rival practices with a branch surgery within a defined radius of any branch of the 
target practice.  The second choice was the number of full time equivalent (FTE) GPs in rival 
practices within this radius.  
 
Over the period we study the number of practices fell from 8451 in 2005 to 8088 in 2012 as 
small practices have closed.  But the total number of GPs increased from 32,738 to 35,415, 
resulting in an increase in the number of GPs in each practice and a fall in the ratio of patients 
to GPs (from 1613 to 1574).  Thus the change in the number of practices within a given distance 
from a practice is a poor measure of the change in the capacity of rival practices to enrol its 
patients. Therefore we use the number of full time equivalent (FTE) GPs in other practices 
within 2km as the measure of competition.  Just over 10% of practices have no rivals within 
2km (Appendix Table A3). They are predominantly in rural areas.  Many practices face a large 
number of rival GPs within this distance. About 20% have between 1 and 10, and 70% have 
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more than 10.  Figure A1 shows the spatial distribution of the GP practice surgeries across 
England in 2010.   In robustness checks we examine different definitions of the market.18  
 
 
4.3 Covariates 
To control for potential selection of practices by patients, patients by GPs, and of location by 
practices and patients, we utilise a large set of time varying covariates measuring demography, 
morbidity and SES.  We estimate models with practice level measure of the covariates and 
also, to further guard against selection into the practice list, we estimate models with the 
covariates measured at the level of the local area from which patients could potentially travel 
to the practice.   
 
We allow for demography by using 10 age-gender bands and population density.  We use three 
types of morbidity measure.  The first is based on the practice prevalences of ten conditions 
(CHD, stroke, hypertension, diabetes, epilepsy, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD), hypothyroidism, cancer, serious mental illness, asthma) recorded as part of the QOF.   
The second is the proportion of patients in a practice who are resident in nursing homes. The 
third is the proportion of the population in small areas who are receiving incapacity benefit or 
disability allowance (IBSD).   We use small area data from domains of the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD) on income, education, crime, and the living environment as measures of 
SES and the attractiveness of an area.  Areas with higher IMD rankings are less deprived.  
 
Population density is available for Middle Layer Super Output Area (MSOA) census areas 
which have mean populations of 7,200. We use the mean density over all MSOAs in which the 
practice has a branch. Age-gender band demographic data is available both for practices and 
for small areas. To construct the local area demographic variables we take population weighted 
averages of the data in each MSOA census areas in which the practice has a branch. 
 
                                               
18
 These include models with the number of rival practices, the characteristics of GPs in rival practices, and 
allowing for non-linear effects.  We do not use competition measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
which are based on market shares because these are endogenous. Using predicted market shares based on choice 
models which exclude quality, as in the literature on hospital competition (Kessler and McClellan, 2000) is 
complex to construct given that the number of practices is orders of magnitude greater than the number of 
hospitals. Since the main non-quality factor affecting demand is patient-to-practice distance (Santos et al, 2016), 
it would likely produce competition measures highly correlated with our measures.    
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The other variables are available only for practice populations or only for small areas. We 
attribute them as necessary to construct measures both practice populations and the populations 
of the local area in which the practice is located.    For the disease prevalences of the local area 
in which the practice is located and the proportion of the population in nursing homes we use 
the means of these variables for the practice and the nearest five other practices.   IBSD and 
the SES measures are attributed to practices as the means of the Lower Layer Super Output 
Area (LSOA) level values weighted by the proportion of the practice list resident in each 
LSOA.19   
 
Summary statistics for the covariates are in Table A1. 
 
4.4 Sample selection 
Our main estimates use an unbalanced panel of all practices in England after dropping practice-
year observations in which the list size was under 1000 or there was missing data on 
covariates.20  In a test of potential endogenous selection of location by practices we re-estimate 
our baseline model (Eq. 1) on a sub-sample of practices in areas which are homogeneous in 
terms of SES. Our assumption is that within these areas the small variation in SES of the 
population will mean that practices have less incentive to locate at one address versus another. 
This should serve to reduce concerns that our estimates are biased by unobserved population 
sorting across practices, driven either by patient selection of practice or practice selection of 
location. 
 
In choosing homogenous areas we face a trade-off.  Using a larger geographical unit will 
provide more within-area variation in practice competition and hence increase precision in 
estimating the effect of competition. But it will make it less plausible that there is little within-
area variation in unobserved factors that might affect practice location.  PCTs contain around 
50 practices and have populations of over 300,000 on average, so are too large. Instead we use 
the smaller areas defined by Parliamentary Constituencies, which contain on average 15 GP 
practices and a population of just under 100,000.  We select a subset of Parliamentary 
Constituencies which are homogeneous in terms of the SES of the small areas (LSOAs) within 
                                               
19
 There were 6781 MSOAs and 32,482 LSOAs in England defined by the 2001 census. (Our data at these levels 
data is time varying.) 
20
 We also drop practices in the Isles of Scilly.  
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them.  To do this, we compute the coefficient of variation in SES (as measured by the overall 
IMD score) across the LSOAs contained within each Parliamentary Constituency.21 We then 
select all practices in Parliamentary Constituencies in the bottom quintile of the distribution of 
the coefficient of variation of the IMD.  Thus each practice in the sample is in an area 
(Parliamentary Constituency) within which there is relatively little variation in the SES and so 
less likelihood of variation in unobserved SES factors which influence practice location and 
quality.  
 
Some of the Parliamentary Constituencies we select will have little variation around a lower 
deprivation (high IMD) score and others will have little variation around a higher deprivation 
(low IMD) score.  But over all the selected Parlimentary Constituencies, the practices exhibit 
considerable variation across the full range of IMD scores.   
 
4.5 Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for our main competition and quality variables are in Table 1. The first 6 
rows present the measures of quality. Higher numbers indicate higher quality, with the 
exception of the ACSC rate where a higher number is a worse clinical outcome. All measures 
exhibit considerable variation, and a relatively high proportion of this is within-practice, aiding 
identification. The last row present our main measure of competition: the numbers of GPs in 
rival practices within 2 km. There are on average just over 25 within 2km.22 
 
Our estimated effect of competition is based on the correlation between changes in the number 
of rivals and changes in quality. As a preliminary examination of this relationship, Figure 2 
presents scatter plots of the six measures of practice demeaned quality against practice 
demeaned competition. For all measures of quality there is either a positive or a non-negative 
relationship between (demeaned) quality and (demeaned) competition.23   
 
 
                                               
21
 On average there are just over 60 LSOAs per Parliamentary Constituency. 
22
 Appendix Table A3 has the statistics for other radii.  
23
 Figure A2 has scatter bin plots of the same data and shows similar patterns.  
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Table 2 presents the coefficients on competition and measures of goodness of fit from models 
estimated for the full sample of all practices over the full period for which the data are available.  
Panel A has the pooled OLS results from a bivariate regression of quality on competition with 
no controls for practice population or morbidity. This shows significant negative relationships 
between the number of rival GPs faced by a practice and both clinical quality (with the 
exception of the ACSC measure where the negative coefficient indicates a positive correlation 
with quality) and patient satisfaction and reflects the lower quality achieved by practices in 
urban areas.    Panel B adds practice fixed effects and shows that once these are allowed for 
the association between number of rivals and quality becomes positive for all measures of 
quality.  Panel C adds controls for population density, practice list size, and practice patient 
covariates for demographics, morbidity, and SES. The pattern of competition effects is similar 
to Panel B though the coefficient estimates are somewhat smaller.  Panel D addresses the 
concern that practices may select patients based on their characteristics and that this will bias 
the estimated competition effect.  Instead of covariates measured at practice level we use 
demographic, morbidity, and SES controls measured at the level of the local area potential 
patient pool that might use the practice.  The model also does not include practice list size to 
avoid endogeneity bias arising because patient choice of practice is affected by quality.  The 
coefficients on competition are somewhat larger than in Panel C and are statistically significant 
for five of the six quality measures. 24   The broad similarity of the estimated effects of 
competition in Panels B, C and D suggest that time varying endogenous selection of by patients 
and practices is not a serious problem. However, our preferred estimates are those in Panel D 
as these control for changes in the nature of the population in the local area. 
 
To further test whether the results are driven by (unobserved) differences in patient case-mix, 
we restrict the sample to practices in areas that are more homogeneous in population 
characteristics. We re-estimate our preferred model (Table 2, Panel D) using only the sample 
of practices in the most homogenous Parliamentary Constituencies.  The results are in Table 3.  
The coefficient estimates on the number of rival GPs for the clinical quality measures are 
similar to those for the full sample. The coefficient estimates for the patient ratings are similar 
                                               
24
 The full set of estimates for this model are presented in Table A4.  
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or slightly larger than those for the full sample. This similarity across samples again suggests 
that selection of patients may not be an issue in our context.  
 
5.1 Robustness tests 
We now subject our estimates to a series of tests with respect to the definition of the local 
market, the measure of competition and measurement error, designed to address the concerns 
over identification discussed above. 
 
Local market  
 
Our design entails choice of a fixed radius for the size of the market. While the choice of 2km 
is motivated by the data on travel patterns and GP location (Appendix Table A3), this is just 
one potential definition. In Table 4 we explore robustness to variation in this spatial definition. 
We re-estimate our preferred model (Table 2, Panel D) for 5 radii ranging from 0.5km to 5km.  
At the smallest radius of 0.5km, there is no association between clinical quality and 
competition, but that between satisfaction and competition remains, albeit less precisely 
estimated.   Results at 1km, 3km and 5km are similar to those at our preferred 2km radius.  The 
magnitude of the coefficients on competition generally fall as the radius increases, at least 
partly because the scale of the competition measure (the number of rival GPs) increases and 
that of the quality measures do not. We conclude that, with the exception of the smallest radius, 
the results are robust to the particular small radius chosen.25  
 
A related potential threat to our identification strategy is that we are picking up changes at the 
PCT level that lead to increases in both numbers of GPs in the local area, and so the number of 
rivals, and in own practice quality. To examine this, we first cluster the standard errors at the 
PCT level.  This makes almost no difference to standard errors (Table 5, Panel A).26 Next, we 
add controls for PCT-year effects. This will control for local policies which may have increased 
quality and number of GPs in all practices, which we could incorrectly attribute to an increase 
in rival GPs. This is a tough test, as it means all identification comes from practice within-year-
                                               
25
 The smallest radius of 0.5km assumes a very small market relative to the average distance between patients and 
practices (1.2km) and 40% of practices have no rival GPs within this distance and it is thus probably too small to 
be a useful definition.   
26
 The (very small) change in the coefficients compared with Table 2, Panel D is because we had to drop a few 
practices which could not be assigned to the same PCT in all years. 
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PCT variation in number of rivals, which is smaller than the practice within-year variation. The 
results are Panel B of Table 5. The association with clinical measures becomes small and 
statistically insignificant, but the association with two of the patient satisfaction remains 
positive and well defined, albeit smaller than in our preferred model.  As an increase in the 
number of rivals maybe driven by PCT-level policies, controlling for year*PCT effects maybe 
over-controlling. If, for example, the within-year PCT increase in number of rivals is what 
practices respond to, then by adding year-PCT effects we wipe out this legitimate variation.  
 
One way to address concerns over potential endogeneity of entry and exit of patients ± and thus 
changes in patient type - in response to competition is to undertake the analysis at a larger 
spatial level than the level at which patient flows arise.  We know that most patients choose 
practices close to their homes. In addition, most patients select practices within their local PCT.  
PCTs are also large and contain around 50 practices. Therefore an analysis at PCT level should 
mitigate any effect of patient movement between local practices as a result of quality changes. 
We therefore aggregated the data to PCT level, using practice list size weighted means of all 
the variables, and re-estimated our preferred specification (Table 2, Panel D). We find (Panel 
C of Table 5) that increases in competition are positively associated with increases in quality 
for five of the six measures.  The associations are somewhat smaller in magnitude and not 
statistically significant, possibly because of the very large reduction in the number of 
observations and the reduction in the variability of competition and quality measured as PCT 
level means.  
 
It is possible that quality measures do not adjust immediately to GP efforts.  For example, QOF 
indicators based on intermediate health outcomes, such as the percentage of diabetic patients 
with controlled blood sugar, are likely to take longer to adjust than those based on recording 
patient symptoms such as blood pressure.  It may also take some time to change patient 
satisfaction.  We therefore estimated models using a one year lag of competition. As this 
shortens our estimation period, we also re-estimated our baseline model using the current 
number of GPs for the same shorter period.  Results for the lagged competition model in Panel 
D of Table 5 are very similar to our baseline estimates from the model using all years of data 
and to the model using current competition with the reduced sample.27  
                                               
27
 Available from the authors. 
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We have argued that the number of GPs in rival practices is a better measure of competition 
than a count of the number of practices because the latter takes no account of ULYDOSUDFWLFHV¶
capacity to take on extra patients.  But a counter argument is that a single rival practice with n 
GPs poses less of a competitive threat than two rival practices with n/2 GPs since practices 
may be horizontally differentiated by location or other practice characteristics.  To test this we 
add the number of rival practices to our baseline model.  The estimated effects of our preferred 
measure (the number of GPs in rival practices) are unchanged (Table 5, Panel E).   
 
We are interpreting our results as effort on the part of GPs. But it may be the case that what we 
are picking up is changes in the local labour markets for GPs, which drives changes in the 
number of GPs in own and rival practices and may also change the composition of GPs. For 
example, in a market where the demand for health care increases, it is possible that the new 
physicians who enter the market (and lead to an increase in the number of rivals) have higher 
quality or more motivation than the existing stock of GPs. This would increase quality, but is 
not a competition effect. 28 
 
We undertake a number of tests for this, which are reported in Table 6. First, in Panel A, we 
add the number of GPs in the practice as an additional covariate. This allows us to test whether 
the association of the number of GPs in nearby practice with practice quality could simply be 
picking up increases in the number of GPs across all practices at the local level. We find that 
adding the number of own GPs to the model leads to only very small reductions in the estimated 
effects of our competition measure (the number of GPs in rival practices).  Second, to explore 
the idea that an increase in GPs in a practice may be accompanied by a change in their 
characteristics, and it is this compositional change that is driving the results, we add 
characteristics of own GPs (% female, % salaried, % qualified outside Europe, % aged under 
40, % aged 40-60) to the model. The coefficients on the competition measure (Panel B) again 
change little. Third, we control for the same characteristics of GPs in rival practices without, 
and also with, the characteristics of GP in own practice, again to test that the results are not 
driven by a change in composition of GPs in the local labour market.  The results, reported in 
                                               
28
 We thank an anonymous referee for making this point. 
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Panel C and D show that our estimates remain basically unchanged. Thus we conclude that 
changes in the composition of GPs in the local market are not driving our results. 
 
Measurement error 
Fixed effects estimates in short panels may be downwardly attenuated due to measurement 
error.  To address this, we collapse our data to two data points per practice  the average for 
the period 2009-12 and the average for the period 2005-8  and examine the change in 
outcomes as a function of the change in number of rivals (with controls for all covariates). We 
cannot do this for two of the satisfaction measures as the series do not exist before 2009. The 
long difference estimates in Table 7 show positive effects of the number of rivals on both 
clinical quality and patient satisfaction. The estimates are a little larger, and better defined, than 
our baseline specification. 
 
We conclude from this battery of tests that practices which face more potential competition 
have higher clinical and/or patient-rated quality, that our results are robust to definitions of the 
market, changes in the number and composition of local GPs and to measurement error.   
 
Exploiting the EAPMC policy 
The EAPMC policy was intended to increase the number of GPs in those PCTs that received 
funding and those PCTs which received EAPMC funding had a larger than average increase in 
the number of GPs in rival practices (Appendix Table A5). One design exploiting this increase 
would be to undertake a difference-in-difference analysis of practices in treated PCTs versus 
other control practices. Such a design requires an assumption of common trends before the 
policy date. In addition, the timing of the policy change needs to be known. In our case, these 
requirements are not clearly met, as the pre-policy period announcement period is only 3 years 
and so it is difficult to establish whether common trends exist or not and it is not well 
documented when different PCTs were able to start to spend their funds after the 
commencement of the policy in 2009. To overcome this in order to exploit this policy change, 
we simply undertake a long difference analysis in which we collapse the data to one observation 
per practice - the average for the period 2009-12 and minus the average for the period 2005-7. 
We then compare the change in outcomes for practices in treated PCTs with those in two sets 
of non-treated (control) practices.  
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The first set of control practices are all practices which are not located in a EAPMC PCT.  The 
set of outcome variables is smaller than for the baseline analysis as two of the patient reported 
outcomes are not available for the full period. The results in Table 8, Panel A, show significant 
association of being in a treated PCT with increases in both clinical quality and patient reported 
satisfaction.  However, as noted above, the PCTs selected to receive extra EAPMC funds were 
not selected randomly.  They differ from other PCTs in terms of competition, clinical 
performance, patient satisfaction and demographics, deprivation  and have higher levels of 
morbidity (Appendix Table A6). This is as expected, since the scheme was specifically targeted 
to those PCTs in which access to GP services was perceived to be poorer.  To deal with this 
we exploit the fact that the treated PCTs are scattered across England (see Appendix Figure 
A1) and share geographical boundaries with non-treated PCTs. The populations along these 
boundaries are likely to be similar in their socio-economic status and their healthcare need.  
The secondary care (hospital) facilities available to both practices and patients are also likely 
to be similar as patients cross PCT boundaries to access hospital care.  In Panel B we therefore 
restrict the sample to treated and non-treated practices located within 2km of the shared 
boundaries.29  The results in Panel B and are very similar to those in Panel A though somewhat 
less precisely estimated, reflecting the smaller sample size.30  
 
5.2 Heterogeneity 
Our large sample allows us to examine whether there are non-linearities in the effect of 
increases in rivals for practices facing different initial numbers of rivals.  We implement this 
in two ways, defining a dummy variable with value of one if the practice is in the lowest 
(highest) quartile of initial competition (defined as the average of financial year 2005 and 2006 
value of competition) and interacting the dummy with the linear competition term. Table 9 
shows that the effect is either linear (using the lowest quartile as the interaction term) or, for 
the patient satisfaction measures, concentrated amongst the practices facing the highest 
competition.   We therefore conclude that the association of a change in the number of rival 
GPs is similar for clinical quality measures across the large range of spatial competition we 
observe in our data while for patient satisfaction this is concentrated where initial levels of 
competition are more intense.  
 
                                               
29
 See Gibbon and Machin (2003) for this approach in the context of school quality.   
30
 The estimate for opening hours changes sign but is not significant in either panel of Table 8. 
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5.3 Magnitude of the effects 
 
The results broadly support the view that increased competition between GPs in geographical 
space increases clinical quality or patient reported quality or both.  However, the magnitude of 
the effect is small.  For example, the competition coefficient of 0.035 in the baseline model 
(Table 2, Panel D) indicates that one extra GP in a rival practice increases clinical performance, 
as measured by population achievement (the percentage of the practice population for whom 
the QOF clinical indicators have been achieved), by 0.035%. This is less than 0.01 of the 
standard deviation of the clinical quality measure and even a one standard deviation increase 
in competition would have resulted in an increase in population achievement of less than one 
fifth (0.17) of its standard deviation.   A one standard deviation increase in competition would 
increase the percentage satisfied with care by 1.3% or 0.20 of its standard deviation.   The long 
difference estimates of the effect of EAPMC are also modest: population achievement 
increased by 0.58% (under 1% of the standard deviation) in EAPMC practices relative to 
practices in non-EAPMC PCTs.  
 
While these are small effects, they need to be set in the context of production of clinical quality 
in general practices. In this setting, individual policy interventions do not have dramatic effects.  
For example, the UK 42)ZDVWKHZRUOG¶Vlargest pay for clinical performance scheme, at a 
cost of around £1 billion per year. It had no detectable effect on overall population mortality, 
nor on mortality from ischaemic heart disease (one of the most strongly incentivised parts of 
the QOF, Ryan et al., 2016), nor on premature mortality (Kontopanatelis et al., 2015).  It also 
had, at best, small effects in improving quality of care for chronic diseases which was its main 
rationale (Gillam et al, 2012; Guthrie, 2016). Other incentive schemes policies for family 
physicians have had similarly modest effects (Scott et al., 2011). And in similar institutional 
settings to the UK NHS, both Brekke et al. (2017) and Dietrichson et al. (2016) also find modest 
effects of competition on GP quality.  
 
6 &RQFOXVLRQV 
 
In this paper we examine the relationship between market structure and quality in healthcare. 
We exploit the universe of all family physician practices in England to examine whether 
increased potential competition from rivals increases quality. There is no price competition as 
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patients are fully insured, so this is an ideal setting in which to examine the relationship 
between market structure and quality. 
 
In common with the literature on hospital and physician markets, we define potential 
competition spatially, basing the distance defining the local markets faced by providers on 
studies of patient choice in the English market.  To derive plausibly causal estimates we use 
within-practice estimators with a large number of controls that allow us to deal with patient 
and practice selection of location. In contrast to most other studies of healthcare markets, we 
examine the effect on both clinical and patient-assessed measures of quality. Thanks to the fact 
we have data on the universe of all practices (firms) in the market, we subject our estimates to 
a number of robustness tests to deal with potential threats to identification and examine 
heterogeneity in the effect of rivals. We also able exploit a policy shock which was intended to 
increase the availability of family physician care in selected areas. 
 
We find that increases in the number of rival practitioners and quality are positively associated.  
The association is more consistent and stronger for our three measures of patient satisfaction. 
They are weaker for two of our three measures of clinical care: total points achieved in the 
national quality pay for performance scheme and emergency hospital admissions for conditions 
which for should be managed in general practice.  This may be because only two thirds of total 
points are earned for quality of care for specific conditions and emergency admissions depend 
in part on local hospital admission policies.   
 
Our results do not appear to be driven by patient selection of practices or practice selection of 
patients, endogeneity of GP location or changes in the composition of general practitioners in 
the local market.  However, the effects are small (as have been other estimates of GP responses 
to competition in similar general practice markets). This may reflect the fact that physicianV¶ 
efforts to improve quality are driven by considerations that are not purely financial, such as a 
concern for patient wellbeing and professional norms (McGuire, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 
2006; Rebitzer and Taylor, 2011). But it may also be due to that fact that entry into this market 
is still relatively heavily regulated, protecting practices from the impact of rivals.31  
 
                                               
31
 Entry decisions into primary care provision have been heavily influenced by local bodies (Primary Care Trusts 
and their successors) that are dominated by GPs.  
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More generally, our results provide some support for policies which seek to increase the 
demand elasticity facing physicians in local markets. Examples include policies to provide 
greater information and the loosening of entry restrictions  (as in the U.S., The Netherlands, 
Germany, the U.K., Sweden and Norway). The setting we examine  fully covered patients 
and physicians reimbursed by centrally determined prices or funding  is common in health-
care systems. The financial incentives facing family physicians in many health-care systems 
are similar to those we examine here: to attract patients to earn revenues subject to convex 
effort costs. This all suggests that the results we find are likely to be generalisable to contexts 
outside the U.K. setting, although empirical testing of this is clearly required in any specific 
institutional context. 
 
Finally, although we have shown evidence of a positive effect of competition on quality of care, 
this does not answer the normative question of whether welfare is unambiguously increased by 
greater competition. What our results do suggest is that benefits from competition should enter 
into any social cost±benefit analysis of policies to increase information and relax constraints on 
choice of family physician (Mays et al., 2014; Siciliani et al., 2017).  
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Figure 1: Family doctor market structure, England 2008 
 
Notes:  HHI is sum of squared shares of Lower Super Output Area populations registered at each general 
practice in England.  LSOAs have mean populations of 1500.  Shades are deciles of HHI distribution 
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Figure 2: Demeaned quality vs demeaned competition  
 
Notes: Years: plots use full set of years for each quality measure. Demeaned quality: practice g quality in year t 
minus mean practice g quality over available years. Demeaned competition: practice g competition (number of 
FTE GPs in rival practices within 2km) in year minus mean practice g competition for same year as quality 
measure.  
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Table 1.  Quality and competition measures: summary statistics 
 Years 
 
Mean SD Min Max Obs 
Quality        
PA clinical 2005-12 Overall 79.13 4.93 5.90 97.33 63968 
 
 
Between 
 
4.52 6.06 95.80 8329 
 
 
Within 
 
2.81 
  
T :7.68 
QOF points (% of maximum) 2005-12 Overall 95.90 5.39 11.84 100 63970 
 
 
Between 
 
4.91 11.84 100 8329 
 
 
Within 
 
3.52 
  
T :7.68 
ACSC admissions per 1000 
patients 2005-12 Overall 12.43 4.97 0 69.54 64000 
 
 
Between 
 
4.32 0 35.88 8348 
 
 
Within 
 
2.57 
  
T :7.67 
% satisfied with opening 
hours 2006-12 Overall 82.48 6.72 0 100 55913 
 
 
Between 
 
5.80 47.96 98.89 8279 
 
 
Within 
 
3.51 
  
T :6.75 
% satisfied with care 2008-12 Overall 90.14 6.60 40.16 100 39684 
 
 
Between 
 
6.02 57.33 100 8103 
 
 
Within 
 
2.79 
  
T :4.90 
% would recommend practice 2009-12 Overall 82.77 10.62 23 100 31555 
 
 
Between 
 
10.01 34.28 100 8024 
 
 
Within 
 
3.76 
  
T :3.93 
Competition        
FTE GPs in practices within 
2km  2005-12 Overall 25.46 24.52 0.00 153.43 64676 
  Between  24.46 0.00 146.49 8351 
  Within  2.61   T : 7.74 
Notes: T  = average number of years of observations per practice.  PA: population achievement; QOF: Quality 
and Outcomes Framework; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition; FTE: full time equivalent. T : mean 
observations per practice. 
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Table 2:  Competition and quality 
 Covariates Quality measure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Practice Local PA clinical QOF 
points 
ACSCs Open hrs 
sat 
Care sat Recommend 
 
FEs Demog Morbidity &  
SES 
Pop 
Density 
Demog Morbidity &   
SES 2005-12  2005-12  2005-12  2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
Panel A N N N N N N -0.021*** -0.039*** -0.017*** -0.044*** -0.082*** -0.121*** 
       [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
R2       0.028 0.062 0.009 0.048 0.110 0.094 
Panel B Y N N N N N 0.057*** 0.027** -0.019** 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 
       [0.008] [0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] 
Within R2       0.044 0.076 0.006 0.080 0.078 0.103 
Panel C Y Y Y Y N N 0.025** 0.016 -0.007 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
       [0.008] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Within R2       0.0889 0.111 0.0469 0.0902 0.0925 0.117 
Panel D Y N N Y Y Y 0.035*** 0.022* -0.005 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
       [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Within R2       0.051 0.078 0.010 0.087 0.080 0.105 
Obs       63,968 63,970 64,000 55,913 39,684 31,555 
Practices       8,329 8,329 8,348 8,279 8,103 8,024 
Notes. Competition measure: N rival GPs: number of FTE GPs in other practices with at least one branch within 2km of a branch of the practice.  All models include 
year dummies.  Practice covariates: characteristics of patients on practice list or mean of characteristics of LSOAs weighted by the proportion of LSOA population on 
the practice list.  Local covariates: demography and SES are means of characteristics of populations of MSOAs in which practice has a branch; morbidity is list size 
weighted mean of morbidity of practice and five nearest rivals.  Square brackets: robust SEs clustered at practice level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 3:  Competition and quality within homogeneous Parliamentary Constituencies  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PA clinical QOF points ACSC Open hrs sat Care sat Recommend 
 
2005-12  2005-12  2005-12 2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
N rival GPs 0.037** 0.022 -0.033*** 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.061** 
 
[0.011] [0.015] [0.009] [0.014] [0.016] [0.023] 
Within R2 0.0834 0.0694 0.0265 0.0682 0.0564 0.0747 
Obs 15,769 15,771 15,810 13,842 9,773 7,754 
Practices 2,081 2,081 2,087 2,072 2,013 1,985 
Notes.  Competition measure: number of FTE GPs in other practices with at least one branch within 2km of a 
branch of the practice.  Sample: practices in 107 Parliamentary Constituencies in the bottom quintile of the 
coefficient of variation of the LSOA level Index of Multiple Deprivation. All models include practice fixed effects, 
year effects, local population characteristics (population density, age/gender proportions, morbidity, SES). Square 
brackets: robust SEs clustered at practice level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 4:  Alternative competition radii 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
PA 
clinical 
QOF 
points 
ACSC Open hrs 
sat 
Care sat Recommend 
 2005-12  2005-12  2005-12 2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
Panel A. Number GPs in rival practices within 500m 
N rival GPs 0.006 -0.011 0.021 0.063* 0.063* 0.089 
 [0.024] [0.029] [0.020] [0.029] [0.030] [0.046] 
Within R2 0.0505 0.0782 0.0103 0.0862 0.0784 0.105 
Panel B. Number GPs in rival practices within 1km 
N rival GPs 0.042** 0.011 -0.009 0.096*** 0.088*** 0.076** 
 [0.015] [0.019] [0.012] [0.017] [0.018] [0.028] 
Within R2 0.0508 0.0782 0.0103 0.0870 0.0792 0.105 
Panel C. Number GPs in rival practices within 2km 
N rival GPs 0.035*** 0.022* -0.005 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Within R2 0.0513 0.0784 0.0103 0.0872 0.0796 0.105 
Panel D. Number GPs in rival practices within 3km 
N rival GPs 0.027*** 0.012 -0.003 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011] 
Within R2 0.0517 0.0783 0.0103 0.0873 0.0796 0.105 
Panel E. Number GPs in rival practices within 5km 
N rival GPs 0.018*** 0.005 -0.000 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
Within R2 0.0524 0.0783 0.0103 0.0876 0.0799 0.105 
       
Obs 63,968 63,970 64,000 55,913 39,684 31,555 
Practices 8,329 8,329 8,348 8,279 8,103 8,024 
Notes: Competition measures: FTE GPs in other practices with at least one branch within 500 metres (panel A), 
1km (panel B), 2 km (panel C), 3km (panel D) and 5km (panel E) of a branch of the practice.  All models include 
practice fixed effects, year effects, local population characteristics (population density, age/gender proportions, 
morbidity, SES).  Square brackets: robust SEs clustered at practice level.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 5.  Robustness: market and competition definitions 
 PA clinical QOF points ACSC Open hrs sat Care sat Recommend 
  2006-12  2006-12  2006-12  2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
Panel A:PCT level errors 
N rival GPs 0.034*** 0.021 -0.003 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.051** 
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.017] [0.014] [0.013] [0.017] 
Within R2 0.0504 0.0806 0.0101 0.0873 0.0799 0.105 
Obs 63,438 63,440 63,556 55,475 39,390 31,325 
Practices 8,215 8,215 8,216 8,203 8,039 7,962 
Panel B:PCT*year effects          
N rival GPs  0.000 0.010 0.003 0.029** 0.036** 0.027 
 [0.011] [0.013] [0.007] [0.011] [0.012] [0.018] 
Within R2 0.109 0.132 0.166 0.141 0.111 0.132 
Obs 63,438 63,440 63,556 55,475 39,390 31,325 
Panel C:PCT level model     
N rival GPs  0.033 0.017 -0.027 0.064 0.038 -0.029 
 [0.031] [0.035] [0.043] [0.041] [0.028] [0.047] 
Within R2 0.248 0.502 0.134 0.156 0.710 0.796 
Obs 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,064 608 456 
Panel D:lagged competition      
N rival GPs t1. 0.035*** 0.022* -0.009 0.020* 0.055*** 0.082*** 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011] [0.015] 
Within R2 0.0380 0.0870 0.00762 0.0863 0.0795 0.106 
Obs 55,672 55,674 55,657 55,890 39,677 31,549 
Panel E:Rival practices and rival GPs      
N rival GPs 0.035*** 0.022* -0.004 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
N rival practices 
-0.123** -0.084 0.169*** 0.040 0.021 0.079 
 [0.047] [0.055] [0.035] [0.049] [0.056] [0.086] 
Within R2 0.0517 0.0785 0.0112 0.0872 0.0796 0.105 
Obs 63,968 63,970 64,000 55,913 39,684 31,555 
Notes: Fixed effects included in all models. Covariates in all models are at local area level.  In Panel C we take list 
size weighted means.  Square brackets: robust SEs clustered at practice level (PCT level in Panel A).  *** p<0.001, 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6.  Robustness: GP composition 
 
            
 PA clinical QOF points ACSC 
Open hrs 
sat Care sat Recommend 
  2006-12  2006-12  2006-12  2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
Panel A ±controlling for N own GPs  
N rival GPs  0.034*** 0.019* -0.002 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.049** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Within R2 0.0505 0.0816 0.0109 0.0874 0.0822 0.109 
Obs 63,572 63,574 63,847 55,461 39,455 31,437 
Practices 8,314 8,314 8,327 8,259 8,091 8,011 
Panel  B ± controlling for N own GPs and own GP characteristics 
N rival GPs  0.033*** 0.019* -0.003 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.047** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Within R2 0.0551 0.0871 0.0118 0.0887 0.0879 0.112 
Obs 63,532 63,534 63,795 55,399 39,393 31,377 
Practices 8,314 8,314 8,326 8,259 8,086 8,003 
Panel C ± controlling for N rivals GPs and rival GP characteristics 
N rival GPs  0.035*** 0.024* -0.000 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.010] [0.010] [0.016] 
Within R2 0.0516 0.0785 0.0111 0.0877 0.0800 0.105 
Obs 63,951 63,953 63,978 55,903 39,683 31,555 
Practices 8,316 8,316 8,326 8,272 8,102 8,024 
Panel D ± controlling for N own GPs and characteristics of own and rival GPs 
N rival GPs  0.033*** 0.021* 0.001 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.049** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.010] [0.010] [0.016] 
Within R2 0.0554 0.0871 0.0124 0.0893 0.0883 0.112 
Obs 63,531 63,533 63,794 55,399 39,393 31,377 
Practices 8,313 8,313 8,325 8,259 8,086 8,003 
Notes. Competition measure: N rival GPs: number of FTE GPs in other practices with at least one branch 
within 2km of a branch of the practice.  N own GPs: number of FTE GPs in own practice.  GP characteristics: 
% female, % salaried, % qualified outside Europe, % aged 40-60, % aged over 60.  All models include practice 
fixed effects, year effects, local population characteristics (population density, age/gender proportions, 
morbidity, SES).  Square brackets: robust SEs clustered at practice level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 7: Long difference estimates of effect of competition  
  ǻPA clinical ǻQOF points ǻACSCs ǻOpen hours sat 
ǻN rival GPs 0.087*** 0.071*** -0.074*** 0.071*** 
 [0.016] [0.019] [0.015] [0.018] 
R2 0.028 0.011 0.029 0.042 
Obs 7,845 7,845 7,845 7,842 
Notes: ǻN rival GPs: average FTE GPs in practices within 2km 2009/10-2011/12 minus average FTE GPs in 
practices within 1km 2005/6-2007/8. ǻQuality, ǻcovariates: average  quality and local area covariates 2009/10-
2011/12 minus average quality and local area covariates 2005/6-2007/8. Square brackets: robust SEs. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 8: Exploiting the EAPMC policy (Long difference estimates) 
     
 ǻPA clinical ǻQOF points ǻACSCs ǻOpen hours sat 
Panel A: All practices 
EAPMC 0.583*** 0.430** 0.108 0.190 
 [0.116] [0.132] [0.102] [0.130] 
R2 0.026 0.009 0.022 0.040 
Obs 7,792 7,792 7,793 7,789 
Panel B: practices within 2k km of EAPMC PCT boundary 
EAPMC 0.497* 0.416 0.182 -0.338 
 [0.248] [0.303] [0.207] [0.284] 
Within R2 0.040 0.032 0.050 0.090 
Obs 1,125 1,125 1,126 1,125 
Notes: Model: ǻQuality regressed on constant, EAPMC, ǻcovariates. ǻQuality and ǻcovariates: average  quality 
and local area covariates 2009/10-2011/12 minus average quality and local area covariates 2005/6-2007/8.  
EAPMC: indicator for practice in an EAPMC PCT.  Square brackets: robust SEs. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
 
Table 9: Heterogeneity with respect to initial competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
PA clinical QOF 
points 
ACSC Open hrs 
sat 
Care sat Recommend 
  2005-12  2005-12  2005-12  2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
Panel A: interaction with bottom quartile of initial competition  
  
N rival GPs 0.036*** 0.022* -0.005 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 
  [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Q1*N rival GPs -0.042 -0.011 0.058 0.045 -0.156* -0.071 
  [0.049] [0.050] [0.046] [0.063] [0.077] [0.099] 
Within R2 0.051 0.079 0.010 0.087 0.80 0.106 
Panel B: interaction with top quartile of initial competition  
N rival GPs 0.029* 0.042** -0.002 0.006 0.026 0.011 
  [0.013] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.025] 
Q4*N rival GPs 0.009 -0.029 -0.003 0.072*** 0.043* 0.066* 
  [0.016] [0.019] [0.013] [0.019] [0.019] [0.031] 
Within R2 0.051 
 
0.079 0.010 0.088 0.80 0.106 
Obs 63,879 63,879 63,881 63,906 55,822 39,622 
Practices 8,307 8,307 8,307 8,312 8,261 8,087 
Notes: N rival GPs: number of FTE GPs in other practices with at least one branch within 2 km of a branch of the 
practice. Q1 (Q4): practice was in lowest (highest) competition quartile of average 2005/6 and 2006/7 competition.  
All models include practice fixed effects, year effects, local population characteristics (population density, 
age/gender proportions, morbidity, SES).  Square brackets: robust SEs clustered at practice level.  *** p<0.001, 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix  
 
Figure A1.  EAPMC PCTs and all GP surgeries, England 2010
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Figure A2: Demeaned quality vs demeaned competition: scatter bin plots 
 
Notes: Years: plots use full set of years for each quality measure. Demeaned quality: practice g quality in year t 
minus mean practice g quality over available years. Demeaned competition: practice g competition (number of 
FTE GPs in rival practices within 2km) in year minus mean practice g competition for same year as quality 
measure. 2009 to 2012.  Plots produced by binsreg with optimally chosen number of bins and cubic spline estimate 
of regression function over bins. 
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Table A1: Covariate summary statistics (2005/6-2012/13) 
    Mean SD Min Max 
Local area covariates      
Population Density (000s per sq km) Overall 3.72 3.65 0.01 25.16 
 Between  3.65 0.01 24.52 
 Within  0.23   
% of males 0-15  Overall 9.78 2.02 1.14 19.39 
 Between  1.99 1.64 19.05 
 Within  0.37   
% of males 16-24  Overall 6.20 2.79 2.45 35.61 
 Between  2.75 2.73 34.35 
 Within  0.43   
% of males 50-64  Overall 8.51 1.93 1.23 14.50 
 Between  1.92 1.43 13.96 
 Within  0.28   
% of males at least 65 Overall 6.79 2.35 0.80 20.79 
 Between  2.31 1.07 18.80 
 Within  0.41   
% of females 0-15  Overall 9.33 1.94 0.92 19.10 
 Between  1.92 1.50 18.78 
 Within  0.35   
% of females 16-24  Overall 6.13 2.87 2.12 42.59 
 Between  2.83 2.27 39.24 
 Within  0.43   
% of females 25-49  Overall 17.82 2.74 4.53 32.62 
 Between  2.72 5.02 31.09 
 Within  0.43   
% of females 50-64  Overall 6.59 1.95 0.95 14.22 
 Between  1.47 1.17 10.77 
 Within  1.29   
% of females at least 65 Overall 10.91 3.83 0.69 33.16 
 Between  3.64 1.35 31.52 
 Within  1.19   
Income IMD score rank Overall 14.45 7.73 0.06 32.44 
 Between  7.70 0.15 32.38 
 Within  0.66   
Crime IMD score rank Overall 14.34 7.82 0.04 32.33 
 Between  7.67 0.23 31.95 
 Within  1.52   
Living IMD score rank Overall 13.96 7.95 0.07 32.54 
 Between  7.87 0.12 32.27 
 Within  1.25   
Education IMD score rank Overall 15.28 8.09 0.06 32.55 
 Between  8.06 0.07 32.37 
 Within  0.79   
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    Mean SD Min Max 
% of residents on IBDA Overall 5.15 2.44 0.28 17.76 
 Between  2.41 0.40 17.36 
  Within  0.31   
Practice plus 5 nearest rivals      
1XUVLQJKRPHSDWLHQWVµV Overall 5.21 3.40 0.00 73.44 
 Between  1.84 0.00 14.79 
 Within  2.87   
CHD prevalence (%) Overall 3.51 1.00 0.32 11.28 
 Between  0.69 1.28 6.31 
 Within  0.72   
Stroke prevalence (%) Overall 1.66 0.49 0.10 5.73 
 Between  0.34 0.65 2.75 
 Within  0.36   
Hypertension prevalence (%) Overall 13.19 2.55 1.81 43.95 
 Between  1.64 6.37 21.94 
 Within  1.95   
Diabetes prevalence (%) Overall 4.28 0.97 0.94 13.61 
 Between  0.65 2.08 7.42 
 Within  0.72   
Epilepsy prevalence (%) Overall 0.61 0.14 0.06 1.59 
 Between  0.10 0.28 1.19 
 Within  0.10   
COPD prevalence (%) Overall 1.59 0.62 0.06 7.24 
 Between  0.43 0.58 4.44 
 Within  0.45   
Hypothyroidism prevalence (%) Overall 2.84 0.79 0.18 7.29 
 Between  0.54 0.91 6.06 
 Within  0.57   
Cancer prevalence (%) Overall 1.31 0.55 0.10 4.29 
 Between  0.45 0.35 2.79 
 Within  0.31   
Mental illness prevalence (%) Overall 0.77 0.25 0.14 2.50 
 Between  0.16 0.29 1.61 
 Within  0.20   
Asthma prevalence (%) Overall 5.90 0.89 0.66 13.50 
 Between  0.61 3.27 9.63 
 Within  0.65   
Note. IMD rank scores are IMD rank divided by the number of LSOAs (32,482).  Observations: 63,968 practice-
year observations on 8329 practices over an average of 7.68 years. 
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Table A2:  Quality and competition measures: correlations between demeaned variables 
(2009/12-2012/13) 
 PA clinical QOF 
points 
ACSCs Open hrs 
satisfact 
Overall 
satisfact 
Recommend N rival 
GPs 
QOF points 0.5943* 1      
ACSCs per 1000 patients -0.0115* -0.0308* 1     
Open hrs satisfaction 0.0621* 0.1244* 0.0027 1    
Overall satisfaction 0.0353* -0.0450* 0.0398* 0.3937* 1   
Recommend 0.0180* -0.0693* 0.0424* 0.2909* 0.6858* 1  
N rival GPs 0.0473* 0.0306* -0.0192* 0.0526* 0.0171* -0.0018 1 
N rival practices -0.0284* -0.0059 0.0413* 0.0001 0.0214* 0.0303* -0.0383* 
Notes. N rival GPs: number of full-time equivalent GPs in other practices with at least one branch within 2km of 
a branch of the practice. N rival practices: number of GP practices with at least one branch within 2km of a 
branch of the practice. 
 
 
Table A3: Competition measures at different radii  
 
 
Number of GPs in rival practices within radius 
Proportion patients 
choosing practices 
within this radius of 
their LSOA 
Radius 
 
Mean SD Min Max % with 
no rivals 
Mean 
500m Overall 3.58 4.70 0 45.99 40.94% 0.125 
  Between 
 
4.67 0 37.67 
  
  Within 
 
0.74 
    
1km Overall 8.73 8.79 0 67.45 20.71% 0.359 
  Between 
 
8.74 0 57.46 
  
  Within 
 
1.24 
    
2km Overall 25.46 24.52 0 153.43 10.78% 0.681 
  Between 
 
24.46 0 146.49 
  
  Within 
 
2.61 
    
3 km Overall 49.42 49.62 0 298.91 7.86% 0.823 
  Between 
 
49.64 0 278.82 
  
  Within 
 
4.37 
    
5km Overall 116.24 126.01 0 677.77 4.04% 0.932 
  Between 
 
126.26 0 626.68 
  
  Within 
 
9.07 
    
Notes: Statistics for FTE number of GPs in rival practices from 64,676 observations on 8351 practices, 2005-
2012. Statistics for proportion of patients choosing a practice within different distances from the centroid of 
their LSOA are for April 2010 for patients resident in 2875 LSOAs in the East Midlands region 
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Table A4:  Full results basic model (Table 2, Panel D) 
  PA clinical QOF points ACSCs Open hrs sat Care sat Recommend 
  2005-12 2005-12 2005-12 2006-12 2008-12 2009-12 
N rival GPs 2km 0.035*** 0.022* -0.005 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.015] 
Population Density 0.265* -0.219 -0.272*** 0.954*** -0.072 0.037 
 [0.119] [0.148] [0.081] [0.170] [0.194] [0.312] 
Males  0-15 0.045 -0.098 0.004 0.239** -0.136 -0.220 
 [0.073] [0.084] [0.053] [0.086] [0.100] [0.175] 
Males 16-24 -0.068 -0.130 0.031 0.141 0.002 0.071 
 [0.062] [0.070] [0.045] [0.074] [0.083] [0.134] 
Males  50-64 0.182* 0.144 -0.176** 0.286** -0.079 -0.336 
 [0.089] [0.102] [0.064] [0.108] [0.117] [0.203] 
Males  65plus -0.332*** -0.130 0.172* 0.292* -0.087 -0.349 
 [0.092] [0.109] [0.068] [0.115] [0.129] [0.224] 
Females  0-15 -0.117 -0.201* 0.105 0.034 -0.194 -0.339 
 [0.074] [0.089] [0.056] [0.092] [0.107] [0.187] 
Females  16-24 0.100 0.099 0.040 0.156* -0.121 -0.343* 
 [0.066] [0.078] [0.047] [0.079] [0.092] [0.162] 
Females  25-49 -0.011 -0.120 0.126* 0.287** -0.051 -0.308 
 [0.083] [0.100] [0.058] [0.097] [0.107] [0.180] 
Females  50-64 0.112 -0.307** 0.181** 0.463*** -0.049 -0.067 
 [0.081] [0.097] [0.057] [0.098] [0.104] [0.179] 
Females  65plus -0.095 -0.116 0.112* 0.451*** -0.022 0.106 
 [0.074] [0.087] [0.051] [0.090] [0.100] [0.177] 
Income IMD score rank 0.017 -0.045 -0.022 0.249*** 0.074 0.743 
 [0.028] [0.034] [0.019] [0.036] [0.040] [0.560] 
Crime IMD score rank -0.019 0.009 -0.006 -0.070*** -0.030* -0.063* 
 
[0.012] [0.013] [0.008] [0.015] [0.015] [0.028] 
Living IMD score rank -0.009 0.006 0.015 -0.011 -0.035* -0.041 
 
[0.014] [0.017] [0.011] [0.018] [0.017] [0.031] 
Education IMD score rank 0.169*** 0.043 0.043** -0.013 0.047 0.049 
 
[0.024] [0.027] [0.016] [0.031] [0.032] [0.056] 
% of residents on IBDA  -0.227* -0.133 0.289*** -0.179 -0.256 -0.331 
 
[0.098] [0.119] [0.071] [0.110] [0.137] [0.241] 
Nursing Home patients 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] 
 CHD Prevalence 0.065 0.037 0.003 0.012 0.067 -0.040 
 [0.038] [0.047] [0.036] [0.051] [0.053] [0.084] 
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 Stroke Prevalence -0.025 -0.085 0.107 -0.041 -0.072 0.115 
 [0.076] [0.094] [0.074] [0.102] [0.104] [0.167] 
 Hypertension Prev -0.019 -0.036* 0.000 0.027 0.006 0.022 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016] [0.017] [0.027] 
 Diabetes Prevalence -0.012 0.030 -0.023 -0.011 0.022 0.092 
 [0.024] [0.029] [0.022] [0.032] [0.032] [0.050] 
 Epilepsy Prevalence 0.062 0.023 -0.069 0.058 -0.259 -0.155 
 [0.175] [0.214] [0.167] [0.235] [0.238] [0.381] 
 COPD Prevalence -0.087 -0.025 -0.011 0.004 0.005 -0.010 
 [0.045] [0.054] [0.040] [0.057] [0.057] [0.093] 
 Hypo Prevalence 0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.025 -0.008 -0.076 
 [0.033] [0.041] [0.031] [0.044] [0.046] [0.071] 
 Cancer Prevalence 0.034 0.143 -0.023 -0.074 -0.087 -0.032 
 [0.068] [0.082] [0.061] [0.090] [0.092] [0.146] 
 Mental Illness Prevalence 0.047 -0.006 0.074 0.032 0.012 -0.029 
 [0.069] [0.087] [0.062] [0.091] [0.089] [0.145] 
 Asthma Prevalence 0.010 0.010 -0.019 -0.014 0.022 -0.001 
 [0.021] [0.026] [0.020] [0.028] [0.029] [0.046] 
year2006 0.289*** -0.854*** -0.331*** 
   
 [0.047] [0.057] [0.039] 
   
year2007 1.506*** 0.365*** -0.606*** -1.825*** 
  
 [0.060] [0.066] [0.045] [0.049] 
  
year2008 1.595*** -1.098*** -0.408*** -2.669*** 
  
 [0.070] [0.078] [0.054] [0.068] 
  
year2009 0.942*** -2.586*** -0.547*** -2.193*** -0.451*** 
 
 [0.083] [0.095] [0.063] [0.081] [0.041] 
 
year2010 1.337*** -1.883*** -0.301*** -3.097*** -0.744*** -0.310*** 
 [0.096] [0.109] [0.072] [0.097] [0.061] [0.066] 
year2011 1.228*** 0.883*** -0.744*** -0.775*** -1.100*** -1.016*** 
 [0.145] [0.179] [0.119] [0.184] [0.180] [0.246] 
year2012 0.693*** 0.058 -0.929*** -1.897*** -2.166*** -2.557*** 
 [0.151] [0.190] [0.125] [0.190] [0.185] [0.251] 
Constant 76.781*** 105.534*** 6.371* 55.909*** 96.830*** 90.675*** 
 [4.119] [4.984] [2.970] [4.873] [5.421] [12.046] 
Observations 63,968 63,970 64,000 55,913 39,684 31,555 
Practices 8,329 8,329 8,348 8,279 8,103 8,024 
Within R2 0.0513 0.0784 0.0103 0.0872 0.0796 0.105 
 
Notes. Competition measure: N rival GPs: number of full-time equivalent GPs in other practices with at least one branch within 
2km of a branch of the practice.  All models include practice fixed effects.  Local area covariates. Square brackets: robust SEs 
clustered at practice level.   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A5.  Effect of EAPMC on competition (N GPs in rival practices) 
 
N rival GPs 
within 2km 
EAPMC 1.096*** 
 [0.095] 
R2 0.018 
Obs 7,793 
After: Dependent variable: Mean 2009-11 N GPs in rival practices minus mean 2005-7 N GPs in rival practices. 
EAPMC: practice was in an EAPMC PCT.   
 
 
Table A6: Comparison of EAPMC and non-EAPMC practices (average 2005-2007) 
 
 
All practices Practices within 2km of EAPMC 
boundary 
 
Non-
EAPMC 
EAPMC t-stat for 
difference 
in means 
Non-
EAPMC 
EAPMC t-stat for 
difference 
in means 
N rival GPs within 2km 23.98 27.34 11.73 34.56 27.67 -9.44 
PA clinical 78.80 78.29 -5.51 78.98 78.13 -4.85 
QOF points 96.73 95.42 -13.46 96.09 95.43 -3.36 
ACSC 11.66 15.37 46.15 12.34 14.40 13.62 
Open hrs sat 82.91 83.95 7.62 81.88 82.91 3.63 
Population density 3.49 4.16 14.62 5.53 3.94 -13.83 
Income IMD score rank 15.72 9.85 -55.99 13.38 10.81 -11.75 
Crime IMD score rank 15.54 10.08 -55.94 12.38 10.43 -10.46 
Living IMD score rank 14.80 10.53 -38.85 11.57 11.82 1.17 
Education IMD rank score 16.77 10.19 -59.00 16.77 11.72 -21.40 
IBDA (%)  4.40 6.64 58.60 4.90 5.97 15.31 
Nursing Home patients (%) 5.15 5.39 4.67 5.20 5.29 0.79 
CHD Prevalence (%) 3.48 3.61 8.81 3.45 3.56 3.88 
Stroke Prevalence (%) 1.66 1.67 1.99 1.67 1.67 0.50 
Hyper Prevalence (%) 13.25 13.06 -4.93 13.20 13.19 -0.05 
Diabetes Prevalence (%) 4.34 4.08 -18.07 4.28 4.19 -2.98 
Epilepsy Prevalence (%) 0.61 0.62 4.47 0.61 0.62 1.83 
COPD Prevalence (%) 1.60 1.58 -1.41 1.58 1.60 0.84 
Hypo Prevalence (%) 2.88 2.74 -11.59 2.89 2.81 -3.20 
Cancer Prevalence (%) 1.36 1.15 -27.06 1.37 1.26 -7.18 
Mental Illness Prevalence (%) 0.78 0.74 -11.85 0.79 0.76 -3.69 
Asthma Prevalence (%) 5.89 5.92 2.27 5.83 5.88 2.17 
 
Notes: Covariates measured at local area level.  Number of observations for t tests: All practices - N rival GPs, 
covariates 24573; PA clinical 24406, QOF points 24407, ACSC 24403, Open Hrs sat 16085;  Practices within 
2km of EAPMC border  N rival GPs, covariates 3632, PA clinical, QOF points 3597, ACSC 3601, Op Hrs sat 
2738.  
 
 
